We consider two models of economic growth with exhaustible natural resources, exogenous technical progress and agents heterogeneous in their time preferences. In the first model we assume private ownership of natural resources. We show that every competitive equilibrium in this model converges to a balanced-growth equilibrium. The long-run extraction rate and the rate of growth are determined by the discount factor of the most patient agents. The second model assumes public ownership of natural resources. The resource revenue is equally distributed among agents, who choose the resource extraction rate by voting. We define an intertemporal voting equilibrium and show that it also converges to a balanced-growth equilibrium. The long-run voting equilibrium extraction rate and the rate of growth are determined by the median discount factor. Our results suggest that, all other things being equal, the growth rate in the case of private ownership is higher than that of public ownership if the most patient agents do not constitute the majority of the population; otherwise, there is no difference in the growth rates between the two regimes. However, in the long run private ownership leads to a higher level of inequality than public ownership. If we take into account the detrimental effect of inequality on economic growth, then the public property regime will likely result in a higher long-run rate of growth compared to the private property regime.
Introduction
The question of property rights is one of the most controversial and complicated issues concerning the regulation of natural resources. Who should own natural resources, and in what form? Which individual, group or institution will best manage the resource stock in the short and long run? How do different forms and extents of property rights on natural resources affect both present and future generations? These are important and inherently complex problems.
The vast amount of literature on property regimes over natural resources (see, e.g., Ostrom, 1990 ; Barnes, 2009; Cole and Ostrom, 2011) usually places great emphasis on the market failure that occurs when property rights are not properly specified. The relative advantages of private and common property rights in terms of efficiency, equity, and sustainability of natural resource use patterns have been widely discussed and studied.
However, even if property rights are clearly defined and assigned, the optimal choice from a wide array of diverse property regimes is not so obvious. Especially significant in this connection is the choice between private and public property. There has been much debate on the economic and political merits of private versus public ownership in general (see, e.g., a survey by Shleifer, 1998) . Interestingly enough, economists have only recently begun to pay attention to the comparison of private and public ownership in the particular case of natural resources like crude oil or gold. This is even more surprising considering the ambiguity of this issue and its consequences for societies in resource-rich countries. There are many countries in the world that maintain full state ownership of their natural resources. In such countries private firms, especially foreign firms, have little or no operational and managerial control. Examples include Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Nigeria, and modern Venezuela. At the same time, there are countries like Kazakhstan or the Russian Federation, where leaders chose to privatize their energy sector (see Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2001 ). One should also mention the USA and Japan, where private firms own and control much of the countries' subsurface minerals.
There are certain rationales for such cleavage. On the one hand, exhaustible resource stocks (oil and gas fields, coal and ore mines) are universally regarded by the public at large as public property. It is felt that natural resources should belong to local peoples, who claim sovereign rights on their territorial habitat. Thus these resources cannot be extracted by private companies without government permission. Moreover, for many countries around the world, especially developing countries, natural resources represent a significant share of income and are too important to be left to the market. It is believed that direct state control over resources is an indispensable feature of national sovereignty and political decision-making (see Mommer, 2002) .
On the other hand, most economists are convinced that the private property regime over natural resources leads to higher efficiency than the public property regime. Empirical evidence shows that private natural resource companies are more efficient and profitable than nationalized firms, though the effects of privatization on employment and income distribution are not as desirable (see, e.g., Chong and Lopez de Silanes, 2005; Schmitz and Teixeira, 2008) .
One may conjecture that this divergence between the positions of the public at large and economists partly explains the fact that privatization-nationalization cycles tend to occur more often in the natural resource sector (see, e.g., Kobrin, 1984; Chua, 1995; Hogan et al, 2010) . This tendency provides additional incentive to study the impact of property regime over natural resources on macroeconomic parameters.
The existing empirical literature on ownership of the primary sectors (e.g., Megginson, 2005; Wolf, 2009) concentrates mostly on the productive efficiency and profitability of firms. The effects of different property regimes on aggregate income are studied in (Brunnschweiler and Valente, 2013) , though they use a slightly different classification of ownership instead of the usual dichotomy between the categories of "private" and "public".
In this paper, we study private and public property regimes over exhaustible natural resources from the standpoint of economic growth theory. We do not compare private and public ownership in terms of efficiency or optimality. The question we explore is the following: which of the two property regimes does lead to a higher long-run rate of economics growth?
Developing the ideas appeared in (Borissov and Surkov, 2010) , we consider two models of economic growth with heterogeneous agents and exhaustible resources. These models are modifications to a well-known Ramsey-type model of economic growth with exhaustible resources (see, e.g., Dasgupta and Heal, 1979) . Technical progress is exogenous. Under this assumption the long-run rate of growth is fully determined by the extraction rate.
The two models differ in the property regimes over natural resources. The first model assumes private ownership of natural resources. The resource stock is an asset. Agents can invest their savings in natural resources as well as in physical capital. This implies that the resource revenue belongs to the owners of natural resources. The extraction rate is determined by market forces. In the second model we assume that the resource stock is held in trust by the government for the common benefit. The resource revenue is equally distributed among all agents, and it is up to the government to determine the extraction rate.
Following (Becker, 1980 ; see also Becker, 2006) , we assume that agents are heterogeneous in their time preferences. The rate of time preference, or the degree of impatience, is represented by the discount factor of agent. The discount factors are higher for more patient agents and lower for less patient ones.
In the private property regime, the whole capital and resource stocks in the long run belong to the most patient agents. We show that the discount factor of the most patient agents determines both the long-run extraction rate and the rate of growth. The extraction rate is decreasing and the growth rate is increasing in the discount factor of the most patient agents.
In the public property regime, the heterogeneity of agents results in different preferences over the resource extraction rate. Relatively impatient agents care less about the future and prefer to extract resources faster than relatively patient agents. Thus there naturally arises a problem of aggregating individual preferences. We use a conventional collective choice mechanism and suppose that the resource extraction rate is chosen by majority voting.
The performance of majoritarian institutions in dynamic settings has attracted growing interest and attention in recent years (see, e.g., Krusell et al, 1997; Rangel, 2003; Bernheim and Slavov, 2009 ). This body of literature studies appropriate dynamic generalizations of the standard solution concepts. One of these generaliza-tions is presented in (Borissov and Surkov, 2010) . However, the voting mechanism in their approach is oversimplified; it does not imply perfect rationality of agents, and allows one to analyze voting outcome only in a balanced-growth equilibrium.
In this paper, we apply the approach to voting in a dynamic general equilibrium framework proposed in (Borissov et al, 2014) . We use the intertemporal setting of the model, and ask agents to vote on the extraction rate at each point in time under given expectations about the future extraction rates. The sequence of winners in these elections under perfect foresight is called an intertemporal voting equilibrium. We show that in the long run it converges to a balanced-growth voting equilibrium. The long-run extraction rate and the rate of growth are determined by the median discount factor. The extraction rate is decreasing and the growth rate is increasing in the median discount factor.
Our results suggest that the long-run growth rate in the case of private ownership is equal to that of public ownership if the most patient agents constitute the majority of the population, and is higher otherwise. It seems reasonable to conclude that the private property regime is more favorable for promoting long-run economic growth than the public property regime. However, this conclusion is somewhat hasty. The private property regime over natural resources, all other things being equal, results in a higher level of income inequality. This can have a detrimental effect on economic growth.
A high level of inequality increases sociopolitical instability and the risk of expropriation, creating uncertainty in the politico-economic environment. These factors reduce investment incentives and affect the security of property rights. Increased social tension can either lead to a higher extraction rate 1 , or to unproductive costs and losses in output. In both cases the growth rate of the economy is adversely affected.
We consider the two different channels through which sociopolitical instability caused by inequality affects economic growth. The first channel assumes that the discount factors of agents are formed endogenously, and the rise in income inequality increases the impatience of agents (see Borissov and Lambrecht, 2009 ). The second channel assumes that a certain share of output, depending on the level of inequality, is unproductively thrown away. This share might be used to increase military spending, to support and expand various social programs and transfers, etc. Under both assumptions, if the level of inequality in the society is sufficiently high, then the public property regime over natural resources is likely to result in a higher long-run rate of growth compared to the private property regime.
The paper is organized as follows. In the main body of the paper we concentrate on the description of the models and on the general statement of the results. All technical details and proofs appear in Appendices. Wherever we formulate our results, there is a reference to the corresponding proposition or theorem in Appendix.
The main body of the paper consists of the following sections. Section 2 presents the basic building blocks of the model and the descriptions of property regimes. Section 3 is devoted to the model with private ownership of natural resources. We define competitive and balanced-growth equilibria, and present an explicit expression for the equilibrium rate of growth. In section 4 we consider the model with public ownership of natural resources. We define a competitive equilibrium under given extraction rates, characterize a temporary voting equilibrium, and finally turn to an intertemporal voting equilibrium, deriving the expression for the long-run rate of growth. Section 5 compares the long-run consequences of the two different property regimes. In section 6 we modify the models by taking into account the impact of sociopolitical instability caused by inequality on the growth rates. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A contains mathematical details and proofs of the statements related to the private property regime. Appendix B provides a thorough formulation of the public property regime.
The model
We consider a discrete time dynamic general equilibrium model of the economy endowed with the stock of exhaustible resources. The economy is populated with L heterogeneous in their time preference agents.
Production and resource extraction
Firms use physical capital, labor and natural resources to produce a homogeneous good, which is a numeraire in the model. Extraction is costless, and all markets are competitive.
Output is given by the Cobb-Douglas production function:
where A t is total factor productivity, K t is the physical capital stock, E t is the amount of resources extracted in period t (which is identified with the amount of resources utilized in production), and L is the constant over time labor supply. Capital fully depreciates during one time period. Total factor productivity grows at an exogenously given constant rate λ > 0:
The production function in intensive form is given by
t ,
The amount of resources extracted for production decreases the available stock: R t = R t−1 − E t . We denote the resource extraction rate by
so that the per capita volume of extraction e t and the dynamics of the resource stock R t are given by
Since all markets are competitive, the interest rate r t , the wage rate w t , and the price of natural resources q t coincide with the respective marginal products:
Households
There is an odd number L of agents, indexed by j = 1, . . . , L. Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor. Agent j discounts future utilities by the factor β j . We assume
, agents are ordered by decreasing patience, from more to less patient. We denote by J = {j | β j = β 1 } the set of agents with the highest discount factor. These agents appreciate the future higher than the others. We refer to them as the most patient agents. Agents obtain utility from their consumption over an infinite time horizon. Preferences of agent j over consumption stream {c
are given by the log-linear utility function:
Property regimes
In almost every country of the world the state is the de jure owner of domestic natural resources. Thus the primary questions are: who has control over the rights to exploitation of the resource stock? And who has the right to obtain the resource revenue? Following (Borissov and Surkov, 2010), we consider two different property rights regimes over exhaustible resources: private and public. We suppose that the stock of natural resources (e.g., oil or gas fields, coal mines, diamond mine with kimberlite pipes) is divisible, and we do not consider common-pool resources (e.g., oil in the common underground reservoir). It is, in principle, possible to divide the stock into individual parcels and to assign property rights over each parcel.
If proprietary rights over these parcels are established, we refer to this situation as the private property regime. The privately owned resource stock in situ is an asset to its owner. Agents can invest in natural resources as well as in physical capital. By the Hotelling rule, the equilibrium rate of return on the resource stock as an asset is equal to the return on capital. The resource income goes to the resource owner.
There can be other property rights regimes over natural resources. It is reasonable to consider the situation in which the exhaustible resource stock is controlled by the government. We refer to this situation as the public property regime. In this case the resource income is equally distributed among agents, who choose the resource extraction rate by voting.
Note that in the public property regime there is no reason to expect that the Hotelling rule holds. There are incentives for arbitrage operations, as the rate of change of the natural resource price can differ from the interest rate. However, we assume that private storages are forbidden. There is no possibility to store resources; they are utilized immediately after extraction. Thus no arbitrage opportunities can be exploited.
Private property regime
Consider first the case in which the exhaustible resource stock is privately owned. In this section our exposition follows (Borissov and Surkov, 2010) . We introduce the model and specify its main properties. Formal definitions and proofs can be found in Appendix A.
Competitive equilibrium
Suppose we start at time 0. Agent j is endowed with some amount of physical capitalk j and some amount of natural resourcesR j . Given the equilibrium price of natural resources at t = −1, q −1 , initial savings of agent j are determined as s
j +k j . Agent j chooses her consumption plan by solving the problem of maximizing lifetime utility:
Here c j t and s j t are consumption and savings, respectively, of agent j at time t, r t is the interest rate, and w t is the wage rate.
Agents are prohibited from borrowing against their future earnings. Thus their savings must be non-negative. They can be invested in physical capital and in natural resources.
According to the Hotelling rule (Hotelling, 1931) , the return to investment into physical capital and into natural resources must be equal. Hence the price of natural resources q t grows at the rate r t :
We define a competitive equilibrium in the private property regime (starting from some initial distribution of physical capital and natural resources),
, in a standard way by the following conditions:
• agents maximize their utilities subject to budget constraints;
• capital, labor and natural resources are paid their marginal products;
• the Hotelling rule holds;
• aggregate agents' savings are equal to the investment into physical capital and natural resources.
The existence of a competitive equilibrium can be proved following (Becker et al, 1991) . It turns out that if initially the stocks of physical capital and natural resources belong to the most patient agents, then the competitive equilibrium starting from this state is unique (see Proposition A1 in Appendix A). Also, in each competitive equilibrium from some time onward only the most patient agents own the stocks of physical capital and natural resources, and from this time resources are extracted at a constant rate ε * = 1 − β 1 (Proposition A2).
Balanced-growth equilibrium
A balanced-growth equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which output, consumption, savings, the capital stock and the wage rate grow at a constant rate γ * , while the interest rate r * is constant over time. The price of natural resources grows at a constant rate equal to r * (by the Hotelling rule), and resources are depleted at a constant extraction rate ε * . In our model, there exists a balanced-growth equilibrium (see Proposition A3) and in such an equilibrium only the most patient agents own both capital and resource stocks. Therefore, only the most patient agents make positive savings in a balanced-growth equilibrium, while relatively impatient agents make zero savings and consume their wages. This important property is known in the literature as the Ramsey conjecture (Ramsey, 1928 ; see also Becker, 2006) .
It can be checked that the interest rate r * , the extraction rate ε * , and the growth rate γ * are the same for every balanced-growth equilibrium (Proposition A4). Moreover, every competitive equilibrium converges to a balanced-growth equilibrium (for the precise meaning of this statement see Proposition A5). Thus we can concentrate on the characterization of balanced-growth equilibria when exploring the long-run perspective.
The equilibrium extraction rate is determined by the discount factor of the most patient agents:
Consequently, the equilibrium rate of balanced growth depends on the discount factor of the most patient agents and is given by
These formulas can be viewed as a generalization of the well-known results (Stiglitz, 1974) for a representative agent model. The equilibrium extraction rate is decreasing and the rate of balanced growth is increasing in the discount factor of the most patient agents. The intuition behind these results is simple. An increase in patience of the resource stock owners means that they put more weight on additional future consumption than additional present consumption. Thus they prefer to extract less today, which leads to a higher growth rate in the future.
Public property regime
Consider now the case in which the stock of exhaustible resources is held in trust by the government for the common benefit. The resource income is equally distributed among agents who choose the resource extraction rate by voting 2 . In this section we concentrate on the description of the model and on the general statement of the results. See Appendix B for formal definitions and proofs.
Competitive equilibrium under given extraction rates
First of all we need to define a competitive equilibrium under given extraction rates starting at an arbitrary point in time. Suppose that instead of time 0, we start at time τ . Each agent j has some savingsŝ Suppose that at time τ agents have expectations about the future extraction rates, {ε
and notice that the sequence of extraction rates E τ (ε τ ) is in fact arbitrary.
Clearly, given the sequence of extraction rates, the per capita volumes of extraction e t and the dynamics of the exhaustible resource stock R t are predetermined as follows:
Our notation emphasizes the fact that the future volumes of extraction and the dynamics of the resource stock depend on the time τ extraction rate ε τ . Under the predetermined volumes of extraction, agent j solves the following maximization problem:
2 This regime is also discussed in (Borissov and Surkov, 2010) . However, their approach to voting is not free from certain major drawbacks. Voting mechanism in their model allows one to define voting only in a balanced-growth equilibrium. Furthermore, agents do not take into account the fact that policy changes have general equilibrium effects. In this paper, we use an approach based on the rational expectations of agents and the assumption of perfect foresight. This approach allows us to analyze voting outcome in competitive equilibria as well as in balanced-growth equilibria.
Here c j t and s j t are consumption and savings of agent j at time t, r t is the interest rate, w t is the wage rate, and v t is the per capita resource income. The latter is the revenue from sales of the extracted resource to the production sector, equally distributed among agents.
In this model, agents are also prohibited from borrowing against their future income, and their savings must be non-negative. Savings can be invested only in physical capital, and cannot be invested in natural resources. This is an important difference between the private property regime considered above and the public property regime.
A competitive equilibrium
is defined in a standard way by the following conditions:
• agents maximize their utilities subject to the budget constraints;
• the resource revenue is determined by the marginal product of natural resources;
• aggregate agents' savings are equal to investment into physical capital.
Let us clarify our notation E * * τ (ε τ ). We use * * to denote the equilibrium values in the public property regime. The equilibrium starts at time τ , hence the subscript. The equilibrium also depends on agents' expectations about the future extraction rates, and on the parameters of the model. However, we are interested in the dependence of equilibrium variables on the current extraction rate ε τ . For instance, the notation {c j * * t (ε τ )} ∞ t=τ emphasizes the dependence of the equilibrium consumption stream for agent j (and thus her utility) on ε τ .
In the above definition we do not suppose that the Hotelling rule holds. Indeed, the Hotelling rule corresponds to the equilibrium on the asset market, i.e., to the private property regime, where the stock of natural resources is an asset in which agents can invest. In the public property regime, the natural resource stock is not an asset, so the Hotelling rule can be violated 3 . Under some circumstances the rate of change of the resource price may not be equal to the interest rate. However, since we assume that resources cannot be stored privately, all arbitrage opportunities that arise from the violation of the Hotelling rule are forbidden.
The existence of a competitive equilibrium can be proved along the lines of (Becker et al, 1991) . Similarly to the private property regime, if initially the stock of physical capital is owned by the most patient agents, then the competitive equilibrium is unique (see Proposition B2 in Appendix B).
Also, in every competitive equilibrium all but the most patient agents run their capital to zero (Proposition B3). Eventually the whole capital stock belongs to the most patient agents. Thus in the public property regime the Ramsey conjecture also holds true.
Balanced-growth equilibrium under given extraction rate
Suppose that the sequence of extraction rates is constant over time. A balancedgrowth equilibrium under a constant over time given extraction rate ε is a competitive equilibrium in which output, consumption, savings, the capital stock, the wage rate and the resource income grow at a constant rate γ * * , while the rate of change of the resource price and the interest rate are constant over time.
Similarly to the private property regime, for any ε there exists a balanced-growth equilibrium (its characterization is given in Proposition B4). In any balanced-growth equilibrium only the most patient agents make positive savings and own the whole capital stock. It follows that the rate of balanced growth, the interest rate, and the rate of change of the resource price depend on the parameters of the model and on the given extraction rate ε (see Proposition B5). Moreover, every competitive equilibrium under a constant sequence of extraction rates converges to a balancedgrowth equilibrium (Proposition B6).
Thus, we can give a qualitative description of competitive equilibria under given extraction rates. In every competitive equilibrium from some time onward some of the most patient agents own the whole capital stock. They obtain not only wages and resource revenues, but also the capital income. The incomes of all other agents consist only of wages and resource revenues. If, in addition, from some time onward the sequence of extraction rates is constant, then the competitive equilibrium converges to a balanced-growth equilibrium.
Time τ voting equilibrium
Now we make extraction rates endogenous and introduce a voting mechanism into our model. Our approach to voting in the dynamic setting of general equilibrium follows (Borissov et al, 2014) 4 . Suppose at time τ agents are asked to vote on the time τ extraction rate. Suppose that for given expectations about the future extraction rates, {ε e t } ∞ t=τ +1 , and for any ε τ ∈ (0, 1) a competitive equilibrium E * * τ (ε τ ) is unique. Then we can unambiguously specify agents' preferences over the time τ extraction rate as indirect utility functions:
where {c
t=τ is the equilibrium consumption stream for agent j. The consumption streams and objective functions depend on expectations and on the parameters of the model as well. However, we use a notation that emphasizes the dependence on the time τ extraction rate ε τ (the variable on which voting takes place).
The voting method is a majority rule. We define a time τ (temporal) voting equilibrium as a couple {ε * * τ , E * * τ } such that the equilibrium extraction rate ε * * τ is a Condorcet winner in voting on the time τ extraction rate, and E * * τ = E * * τ (ε * * τ ) is the associated competitive equilibrium.
In order to determine the equilibrium extraction rate, we have to articulate how agents vote on the time τ extraction rate. When voting, agents maximize their indirect utility functions defined in (1) . Therefore, it is crucial for us to know how the competitive equilibrium E * * τ (ε τ ) changes when ε τ changes. Suppose that the time τ extraction rate increases, while expectations about the future extraction rates and the resource stock remain intact. In other words, let ε τ be replaced by some other extraction rate,ε τ > ε τ .
The time τ volume of extraction increases by the factorε τ /ε τ . Obviously, output at time τ increases by the factor (ε τ /ε τ ) α 3 . Some simple but tedious calculations (see Lemma B7) show that consumption and savings of all agents, the wage rate, the interest rate, the resource income, and the time τ + 1 capital stock also increase by the factor (ε τ /ε τ ) α 3 , proportionally to the changed output. Further, for all future periods of time the available resource stock decreases: it is multiplied by the factor (1 −ε τ )/(1 − ε τ ) < 1. Since expectations about the future extraction rates do not change, this leads to the proportional decline in the volumes of extraction. Thus there is a trade-off between the future and today's extraction, which leads to the trade-off between the future and today's consumption. The agent's decision on the time τ extraction rate explicitly affects her future consumption by changing the available resource stock. Under our assumptions, for every agent j there exists a unique value ε j τ which maximizes her indirect utility function U j (ε τ ). It is natural to call ε j τ the preferred time τ extraction rate for agent j.
It turns out that the preferred time τ extraction rate for agent j is given by
(see Proposition B7). The preferred time τ extraction rate for every agent is constant over time. It depends only on this agent's discount factor, and does not depend on the expectations or on the current state of the economy. It can be shown that the indirect utility function of each agent is concave, and the median voter theorem applies in this case. A Condorcet winner in majority voting on the time τ extraction rate always exists. Thus there is a unique time τ voting equilibrium, with the extraction rate ε * * τ given by
where β med is the median discount factor (see Theorem B1). Note that the equilibrium time τ extraction rate actually depends neither on the current state of the economy, nor on the expectations of agents. The equilibrium extraction rate is constant over time and depends only on the distribution of the discount factors across the population. This result in particular eliminates a strategic motive to influence the outcomes of future votes. This is the reason why they can really be taken as given.
Intertemporal voting equilibrium
In subsection 4.3 we consider voting on the current extraction rate at an arbitrary chosen point in time τ under given expectations about the future. Now we assume perfect foresight about the future extraction rates and define an intertemporal voting equilibrium as the sequence of time τ voting equilibria for τ = 0, 1, . . ..
Suppose we are given a sequence of extraction rates
Denote by
the associated competitive equilibrium starting at t = 0 under the sequence of extraction rates E * * 0 . Let also for τ = 1, 2, . . .
be the corresponding tail of E * * 0 . Clearly, it is a competitive equilibrium starting at t = τ under the sequence of extraction rates E * *
An intertemporal voting equilibrium is a couple which consists of the sequence of extraction rates E * * and the associated competitive equilibrium E * * such that for every τ = 0, 1, . . ., the time τ extraction rate ε * * τ and the competitive equilibrium E * * τ constitute a time τ voting equilibrium under perfect foresight about the future extraction rates (ε e t = ε * *
It is clear that in every intertemporal voting equilibrium the sequence of extraction rates E * * is constant:
where ε * * = 1 − β med (see Theorem B2). The existence and uniqueness of an intertemporal voting equilibrium are related to the corresponding properties of the underlying competitive equilibria. In particular, if initially the whole capital stock belongs to the most patient agents, then an intertemporal equilibrium exists and is unique (Theorem B3).
Balanced-growth voting equilibrium
A balanced-growth equilibrium for which the sequence of extraction rates is given by (4) is called a balanced-growth voting equilibrium. Put differently, a balancedgrowth voting equilibrium is an intertemporal voting equilibrium in which output, consumption, savings, the capital stock, the wage rate, and the resource income grow at a constant rate γ * * , while the rate of change of the resource price and the interest rate are constant over time.
It can be checked that if initially the whole capital stock is owned by the most patient agents, then the intertemporal voting equilibrium converges to a balancedgrowth voting equilibrium (Theorem B4).
The most important conclusion to emerge from the characterization of a balancedgrowth voting equilibrium is that the voting equilibrium extraction rate is fully determined by the median discount factor:
Consequently, the rate of balanced growth depends on the median discount factor:
It is clear that the more patient the population as a whole is (the higher is β med ), the lower the voting equilibrium extraction rate is and the higher the longrun growth rate is. These results capture the intuition that the more patient agents value the future more highly and tend to smooth their consumption. They vote for the lower extraction rate today in order to maintain a higher resource stock level in the future, which leads to a higher growth rate.
As we have mentioned, the Hotelling rule can be violated. The rate of change of the resource price, π * * , is not necessarily equal to the interest rate r * * . Namely, we have
It follows that if β med < β 1 , then π * * is larger than r * * . However, this should not be a great surprise. In the public property regime agents cannot invest in natural resources, so there is no particular reason for the Hotelling rule to hold.
Generalized intertemporal voting equilibria
Our definition of an intertemporal voting equilibrium is given under the assumption of uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium under given extraction rates. In particular, this assumption ensures the uniqueness of the time τ voting equilibrium and the existence of an intertemporal voting equilibrium.
Let us discuss the general case in which the uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium E * * τ (ε τ ) is not guaranteed. The difficulty here is that we cannot unambiguously define agents' indirect utility functions and obtain agents' preferred values of extraction rates. However, if we apply the technique proposed in (Borissov et al, 2014), we can get around this difficulty. To do this, we impose a certain additional assumption on the beliefs of agents.
Let us assume that agents do not take into account the multiplicity of equilibria and believe that a competitive equilibrium after the change of the time τ extraction rate is associated with a competitive equilibrium before the change in the way discussed in subsection 4.3. Our assumption implies that agents simply act as if the competitive equilibrium E * * τ (ε τ ) is unique for any given extraction rate ε τ . We define a generalized intertemporal voting equilibrium in essentially the same way as an intertemporal voting equilibrium. The only difference is that we do not assume the uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium; it is replaced with the additional assumption about agents' beliefs.
Clearly, any intertemporal voting equilibrium is a generalized intertemporal voting equilibrium. Moreover, if initially the whole capital stock belongs to the most patient agents, then any generalized intertemporal voting equilibrium is an intertemporal voting equilibrium.
Under our additional assumption all the results concerning voting equilibria remain the same as in the case of the unique competitive equilibrium. Namely, the preferred value of the time τ extraction rate for agent j is given by (2) , and the equilibrium time τ extraction rate is constant over time and given by (3). What is important, there always exists a generalized intertemporal voting equilibrium, and the sequence of extraction rates in every generalized intertemporal equilibrium is constant over time and given by (4) (this is the statement of Theorem B5). Furthermore, every generalized intertemporal equilibrium converges to a balanced-growth voting equilibrium (see Theorem B6).
Comparison of the balanced-growth equilibria
Now we are ready to analyze the long-run consequences of different property regimes in terms of economic growth. In the private property regime, every competitive equilibrium converges to a balanced-growth equilibrium. In the long run the whole capital and resource stocks are owned by the most patient agents. Therefore, the equilibrium extraction rate and the rate of balanced growth are determined by the discount factor of the most patient agents and given by
In the public property regime, the sequence of the resource extraction rates is chosen by majority voting. Every generalized intertemporal voting equilibrium converges to a balanced-growth voting equilibrium. In the long run the economy is characterized by the voting equilibrium extraction rate and the rate of balanced growth. They are given by the structurally similar formulas as in the private property regime, but depend on the median discount factor:
It follows that in both regimes the more patient the decision makers are, the lower the extraction rate is and the higher the long-run growth rate is. This is quite reasonable since patient agents decide to extract less today in order to provide a higher standard of consumption in the future. Therefore it is possible to sustain a higher growth rate in the long run.
The question of which property regime leads to a higher long-run growth rate reduces then to the question of the relationship between the median discount factor and the discount factor of the most patient agents. In other words, this is the question of whether the most patient agents constitute the majority of the population. If the most patient agents do not constitute the majority of the population (β med < β 1 ), then the equilibrium extraction rate in the private property regime is lower than in the public property regime. This means that the long-run growth rate is higher in the private property regime. If the most patient agents constitute the majority of the population (β med = β 1 ), then there is no difference in the growth rates between the two regimes in the long run.
Property regimes and income inequality
Our results suggest that the private property regime over exhaustible resources is more favorable for promoting long-run economic growth than the public property regime. However, this conclusion is somewhat hasty. The point is that private ownership, all other things being equal, results in a higher level of income inequality than public ownership.
Both property regimes lead to inequality in the long-run capital income distribution. As we have seen, less patient agents eventually lose the capital income. However, the two property regimes differ in the long-run resource revenue distribution. In the case of the publicly owned resource stock, resource revenue is equally distributed among agents. In the case in which the resource stock is privately owned, resource revenue in the long run belongs to the most patient agents.
It is generally recognized (see, e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1996) that income inequality has a negative impact on economic growth. Inequality increases sociopolitical instability and causes social tension. It creates uncertainty in the politicoeconomic environment, which in turn reduces investment incentives and affects the security of property rights. Uncertainty and social tension induce fear of losing the sources of income. All these can lead either to a faster depletion of resources, or to unproductive costs and losses in output. Both channels reduce the growth rate of the economy. Thus a higher level of income inequality in the private property regime may result in a lower long-run rate of growth compared to the public property regime.
Let us model the two channels through which uncertainty and social tension caused by inequality affect economic growth. Suppose that there is a value p which reflects a detrimental effect of inequality on the economy. Let us assume that p = ψ(G), where G is the Gini coefficient, and the function ψ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] satisfies the following properties:
An exemplary form of this function is shown in Figure 1 . Below we will embed the function ψ(G) in our model and clarify its role in affecting the long-run variables. It is clear that the level of income inequality changes over time. However, for a balanced-growth equilibrium it is constant over time. Let us compare balancedgrowth equilibria in the private and public property regimes, taking into account inequality effects.
In a balanced-growth equilibrium the income distribution depends on two characteristics. The first characteristic is the fraction of stock owners, which we denote by σ. Stock owners are the agents that own both capital and resource stocks in the private property regime, or the agents that own the capital stock in the public property regime. It is clear that the set of stock owners is a subset of the set of the most patient agents, J. If every agent from the set J makes positive savings in a balanced-growth equilibrium, then σ = |J|/N . Otherwise, σ < |J|/N . The second characteristic is the distribution of savings across the set of the stock owners. For simplicity's sake we consider the case in which savings are distributed evenly across the stock owners. Given σ, any other pattern of the savings distribution in a balanced-growth equilibrium results in a higher Gini coefficient. Therefore, for a given σ, the even distribution of savings across the stock owners provides a lower bound of inequality in the society.
It is not difficult to calculate the Gini coefficient based on the income distribution of agents in a balanced-growth equilibrium for both property regimes. We have
where α = α 1 for the public property regime, and α = α 1 + α 3 for the private property regime.
Let us explore the two channels through which inequality affects economic growth. Consider first how uncertainty and social tension, caused by inequality, lead to a faster resource depletion. Following (Borissov and Lambrecht, 2009), we model this possibility by assuming that the discount factors of agents are formed endogenously. Insecure property rights reduce confidence about the future and decrease the discount factors of agents. Agents are not sure of the future and are not able to put the high weight on their future utility. Namely, let us assume that the objective function of agent j is given by
where p = ψ(G), as discussed above. In this case p reflects the insecurity of property rights that lowers the discount factors of all agents 5 . The value (1 − p)β j may be called the effective discount factor of agent j.
The long-run equilibrium extraction rates are now given by
Thus the rates of balanced growth are given by
It follows that a high level of inequality can lead to the increase in the resource extraction rate and to a decrease in the rate of balanced growth. Indeed, suppose that σ satisfies the following condition:
which is the same as
Clearly, this may happen when the level of inequality in the society is sufficiently high, i.e., when there are only a few stock owners. Then, the extraction rate ε * in the private property regime becomes higher, and the corresponding rate of growth 1 + γ * becomes lower, compared to the case in which we do not take into account the impact of the insecure property rights.
If the level of inequality is so high that
then the equilibrium extraction rates under both property regimes become higher, and both long-run growth rates become lower, compared to the case without the inequality impact. Let us compare the growth rates between the two property regimes. It is clear that for 1 + γ * * > 1 + γ * , the following condition must hold:
Notice that when β med = β 1 , condition (6) is equivalent to condition (5). Thus if the most patient agents constitute the majority of the population, and the level of inequality is just sufficient to increase the extraction rate in the private property regime, then our previous conclusion about the same growth rates in the two regimes is no longer true. Taking into account the impact of insecure property rights, it is the public property regime that results in a higher rate of growth compared to the private property regime.
If the most patient agents do not constitute the majority of the population, then condition (6) is more likely to hold for high levels of inequality, i.e., for the low values of σ. In other words, when there are only a few stock owners, it is more likely that the public property regime leads to a lower equilibrium extraction rate (ε * * < ε * ) and a higher rate of growth (γ * * > γ * ) than the private property regime. Consider now how uncertainty and social tension, caused by inequality, lead to the high social costs and losses in output. Assume that in each period certain part of output which depends on the level of inequality is wasted. If the level of inequality is low, then the wasted fraction is zero. If the level of inequality in the society is high, then the level of instability is also high. In order to pacify the population, a certain share of output will be unproductively thrown away. This wasted share may represent military, police or other special forces expenditure, social spending, transfer payments, etc.
Assume that output per capita is given by
where p = ψ(G) now reflects the share of GDP which is drawn away to maintain public order and to prevent possible dissatisfaction of the population about the level of inequality in the society.
Here, the impact of uncertainty and social tension caused by inequality does not influence the equilibrium extraction rates. However, it changes the rates of balanced growth. The growth rate in the case of private property is given by
The growth rate in the case of public property is given by
It follows that for 1 + γ * * > 1 + γ * , it must be that
Again note that when β med = β 1 , condition (7) is equivalent to condition (5). This means that if the most patient agents constitute the majority of the population, then as soon as the inequality matters, the public property regime results in a higher rate of long-run growth than the private property regime. If the most patient agents do not constitute the majority of the population, then the validity of condition (7) is more likely for the low values of σ.
Therefore, the two considered channels through which uncertainty and social tension caused by inequality affect economic growth lead to similar results. When the level of inequality in the society is sufficiently high, the public property regime may lead to a higher long-run rate of growth than the private property regime.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered two Ramsey-type models of economic growth with exhaustible natural resources and agents heterogeneous in their time preferences.
The important difference between the two models lies in the ownership rights over natural resources. The first model assumes that the resource stock is privately owned. The second model assumes that the resource stock is controlled by the government.
In the private property regime, the resource revenue belongs to the owners of natural resources. The extraction rate is determined by market forces. As one would expect, eventually the whole capital and resource stocks are owned by the most patient agents. We show that every competitive equilibrium in this model converges to a balanced-growth equilibrium. In the long run the most patient agents are the only owners and managers of the resource. Their discount factor determines the long-run extraction rate and the rate of growth.
In the public property regime, the resource revenue is equally distributed among all agents, who choose the resource extraction rate by majority voting. We define an intertemporal voting equilibrium and establish its convergence to a balancedgrowth voting equilibrium. It turns out that the preferences of the median agent determine all voting decisions. In particular, the long-run extraction rate and the rate of growth are determined by the discount factor of the median agent.
When comparing the long-run effects of the two property regimes in terms of economic growth, we have to distinguish between two cases. In the first case if the most patient agents constitute the majority of the population, then the rates of growth under the two regimes are equal. In the second case if the most patient agents do not constitute the majority of the population, then the equilibrium extraction rate in the private property regime is lower than in the public property regime. Correspondingly, the growth rate is higher in the private property regime. The intuition behind this result is simple. More patient agents prefer to extract less amount of resource today in order to provide a higher standard of consumption in the future. Therefore, the private property regime, in which the resource extraction rate in the long run is determined by the discount factor of the most patient agents, results in a higher growth rate.
However, the conclusion that the private property regime is better for economic growth than the public property regime is not necessarily true if we take into account the detrimental impact of inequality on the economy. In both property regimes in the long run there is inequality in the capital income distribution. In the private property regime there is also inequality in the resource revenue distribution.
We explore two different channels through which uncertainty and social tension, caused by inequality, affect economic growth. The first channel assumes that the discount factors of agents are formed endogenously, and a higher level of inequality decreases them. The second channel assumes that a certain part of output, depending on the level of inequality, is unproductively wasted. In both cases it turns out that if the level of inequality is sufficiently high, then the public property regime will likely result in a higher rate of long-run growth.
This result suggests that in societies with a moderate level of inequality, private ownership of natural resources is likely to provide a higher long-run growth rate than public ownership. However, in societies with a high level of inequality, the public property regime may result in a higher long-run growth rate compared to the private property regime.
A Appendix 1. Private property regime

A.1 Competitive equilibrium
Suppose we are given an initial state of the economy,
is an initial distribution of physical capital and
is an initial distribution of natural resources among agents.
We suppose that I 0 is a non-degenerate initial state, i.e.,
Definition. A competitive equilibrium starting from the initial state I 0 is a sequence
is a solution to the following utility maximization problem for agent j:
s. t. c 2. Capital is paid its marginal product:
3. Labor is paid its marginal product:
4. The price of natural resources is equal to their marginal product:
5. The Hotelling rule holds:
6. The natural balance of exhaustible resources is fulfilled:
Total agents' savings are equal to the investment into physical capital and natural resources:
The existence of this equilibrium can be proved following (Becker et al, 1991) . Let us prove that if at the initial instant the stocks of physical capital and natural resources are owned by the most patient agents, then the competitive equilibrium starting from this state is unique.
Proposition A1. Suppose that the initial state I 0 is such that
Then there exists a unique competitive equilibrium starting from I 0 ,
, which is given for t = 0, 1, . . . by
The following proposition verifies that in every competitive equilibrium from some time onward the whole capital and resource stocks belong only to the most patient agents. From this time relatively less patient agents make zero savings, and the extraction rate is constant over time and equals 1 − β 1 .
Proposition A2. Suppose that
is a competitive equilibrium starting from an arbitrary initial state I 0 . Then there exists a point in time T such that for all t ≥ T ,
Proof of Propositions A1 and A2. Consider a competitive equilibrium 
is a solution to problem (8) , it satisfies the first-order conditions:
Lemma A1. Let β > 0 be such that for some T
If β j < β, then s j * t = 0 for all sufficiently large t.
Proof. First let us show that if β j < β, then s j * t = 0 for some t ≥ T . Assume the converse. By (9) , for all t ≥ T , 
By assumption, β j /β < 1, and thus c j * t /k * t+1 −→ t→∞ 0. Furthermore, it is clear that k * t+1 ≤ y t , and therefore c j * t
Thus for all sufficiently large t, c j * t < w * t , which is not optimal for agent j. Now we know that s j * t = 0 at least for some t. Let us show that s j * t = 0 for all t ≥ T .
Indeed, assume the converse. Then there are only two possibilities. The first is that there exists T > T such that s j * t > 0 for all t ≥ T . However, applying the same argument as above, we obtain that s j * t = 0 for some t ≥ T . The second possibility is that there are t 1 and t 2 such that T ≤ t 1 < t 2 − 1, and
It follows from the budget constraints of agent j that c j *
However, for t ≥ T ,
Thus, w * t+1 > β(1 + r * t+1 )w * t . Using (9), we get c j *
. Repeating this argument, we obtain c j * t+1 < w * t+1 , t 1 < t < t 2 , which implies c j *
. This contradiction with (10) proves the lemma.
Again assume the converse. Then there are T and ζ > 1 such that
Let us show that (11) implies
Denote J(T ) = {j ∈ J | s j * T > 0}, and recall that
We have
For j ∈ J(T ), (9) holds with equality, so
Repeating the argument, we infer that (12) holds for all t ≥ T . However, from Lemma A1 it follows that s j * t = 0 for all j and for all sufficiently large t. This contradicts the evident positivity of k * t for all t = 0, 1, . . .. Lemma A3.
w * t+1 ≤ β 1 (1 + r * t+1 )w * t , t = 0, 1, . . . . Proof. It follows from (13) and Lemma A2 that for all t,
Proof. Suppose j ∈ J. Then by (9),
, t = 1, 2, . . . , and hence 
Adding together all budget constraints of agent j, we obtain + . . .
.). (16)
Combining (14)- (16), we finally get
and therefore c j *
This proves the desired inequality s j * t+1 ≥ β 1 (1 + r * t+1 )s j * t for t = −1. To prove it for t = 0, 1, . . ., it is sufficient to repeat the argument.
Lemma A5. For sufficiently large T there exists δ > 0 such that for all t > T ,
Proof. From (9) and Lemma A3 it is clear that for j ∈ J c j * t+1
This means that the sequence
is non-decreasing. It is also bounded from above, as consumption cannot exceed total output:
Therefore, this sequence converges, so the sequence Hence there exists δ > 0 such that for all sufficiently large t, w * t+1
Clearly, there exists δ that satisfies β 1 (1 − δ) > max j / ∈J β j . Applying Lemma A1 with β = β 1 (1 − δ), we obtain that for any competitive equilibrium starting from the non-degenerate initial state there exists a point in time T such that for all t ≥ T , s
Lemma A6. For all t ≥ T ,
Moreover,
Proof. Suppose that t ≥ T . By Lemma A4,
At the same time, by Lemma A2,
On the other hand,
Thus,
Starting from t = T , the extraction rate becomes constant over time and equal to ε t = 1 − β 1 . Hence
which completes the proof. Proposition A2 is a corollary of Lemma A6. Proposition A1 also easily follows from Lemma A6. If the initial state I 0 satisfieŝ
, and we can take T = 0. The sequences {r * t }, {w * t }, and {q * t } are derived from the known sequences {k * t } and {e * t }, described in Lemma A6. Thus, in every competitive equilibrium from some time onward only the most patient agents make positive savings, and from this time resources are extracted at a constant rate ε * = 1 − β 1 .
A.2 Balanced-growth equilibrium
Definition. A competitive equilibrium
starting from I 0 is called a balanced-growth equilibrium if there exist an equilibrium rate of balanced growth γ * and an equilibrium extraction rate ε * such that for t = 0, 1, . . .,
The following proposition proves the existence of a balanced-growth equilibrium, and provides its characterization. In particular, it maintains that in every balancedgrowth equilibrium only the most patient agents own the capital and resource stocks.
Proposition A3. A balanced-growth equilibrium
starting from a non-degenerate initial state
and (17)- (20) hold.
Proof. Necessity. Suppose that there exists a balanced-growth equilibrium
starting from I 0 . It is a competitive equilibrium which satisfies (17)- (20) for some r * , ε * and γ * . Repeating a well-known argument by (Becker, 1980; Becker, 2006) , we infer that every balanced-growth equilibrium is characterized by
Moreover, comparing the definitions of competitive and balanced-growth equilibria, we obtain that for every balanced-growth equilibrium the following relationships hold:
Indeed, (25) follows from
We also have
which is equivalent to (26) .
Using (24)- (26), it is easily checked that
Clearly, (21) follows from (23) . Furthermore, a constant over time interest rate is consistent with the definition of a competitive equilibrium if and only if
Taking into account (27) , we obtain (22) . Sufficiency. Suppose that the initial state I 0 is such that (21)- (22) hold. Consider the sequence
starting from I 0 and determined by (17)- (20) . It is easily checked that this sequence is a competitive equilibrium which is described in Proposition A1, with the constant interest rate
Therefore, E * is a competitive equilibrium which satisfies (17)- (20), i.e., a balancedgrowth equilibrium.
It follows that the interest rate r * , the equilibrium extraction rate ε * , and the equilibrium rate of balanced growth γ * are uniquely determined by the parameters of the model and are the same for every balanced-growth equilibrium.
Proposition A4. For every balanced-growth equilibrium,
Proof. It is sufficient to repeat the argument used in the proof of Proposition A3.
Combining (24)- (26), we obtain (28)- (30) .
The following proposition maintains that every competitive equilibrium converges to a balanced-growth equilibrium.
Proposition A5. Every competitive equilibrium starting from an arbitrary initial state satisfies the following asymptotic properties:
where 1 + γ * = (1 + λ)
Proof. Clearly, it is sufficient to consider t > T . It follows from Proposition A2 that
and thus
Iterating, we get From Lemma A6 we know that
(1 + r * t ). Now (32) is straightforward. It also follows from Lemma A6 that s j * t+1 s j * t = β 1 (1 + r * t ) for j ∈ J, which proves (33).
Clearly, for j ∈ J c j * t
and thus the sequence c j * t /k * t converges to a positive constant as t → ∞. For j / ∈ J, we have simply c j * t = w * t . Thus consumption of all agents asymptotically grows at a constant rate. This proves (34).
It remains to note that (35) follows from the Hotelling rule.
B Appendix 2. Public property regime
B.1 Competitive equilibrium under given extraction rates
Suppose that the economy at time τ is in the state
L j=1 are agents' savings andR τ −1 is the stock of natural resources. We suppose that I τ −1 is a non-degenerate state, i.e.,
Suppose we are also given a sequence of extraction rates E τ = {ε t } ∞ t=τ . Given extraction rates E τ and the resource stock R τ −1 =R τ −1 , the volume of extraction e t and the dynamics of the exhaustible resource stock R t are also determined. They are given by
We use this notation to emphasize that the sequence of extraction rates in fact determines the volume of extraction and the dynamics of the resource stock.
Definition.
A sequence
is a competitive E τ -equilibrium starting from I τ −1 if
1. For each j = 1, . . . , L, the sequence c j * * t , s j * * t ∞ t=τ is a solution to the following utility maximization problem for agent j:
2. Aggregate savings are equal to the capital stock:
3. Capital is paid its marginal product:
4. Labor is paid its marginal product:
5. The price of natural resources is equal to their marginal product:
6. The resource revenue is given by:
v * * t = q * * t e t , t = τ, τ + 1, . . . . In this definition e t = e t (E τ ), t = τ, τ + 1, . . ..
Here we do not suppose that the Hotelling rule is satisfied. The Hotelling rule is an equilibrium condition for the asset market. This is the reason why the Hotelling rule holds in the private property regime, where the stock of natural resources is an asset in which agents can invest. In the public property regime, the resource stock is not an asset, so there is no particular reason for the Hotelling rule to hold. Under some circumstances the rate of change of the resource price is not equal to the interest rate.
It is clear that if
is a competitive E τ -equilibrium starting from {(s
In other words, competitive equilibria are time consistent.
The existence of a competitive E τ -equilibrium can be proved along the lines of (Becker et al, 1991) . Proposition B1. For any non-degenerate state I τ −1 , there exists a competitive equilibrium starting from this state.
The issue with uniqueness is more subtle. We can only conjecture that the competitive equilibrium is unique. However, we have no proof of this conjecture. At the same time, the following proposition maintains that the competitive equilibrium starting from the state where the whole stock of physical capital is owned by the most patient agents is unique.
Proposition B2. Suppose that I τ −1 is such thatŝ j τ −1 = 0 (j / ∈ J). Then there exists a unique competitive E τ -equilibrium starting from I τ −1 ,
, which is given for t = τ, τ + 1, . . . by c j * * t
where s j * * τ −1 =ŝ j τ −1 , and e t = e t (E τ ).
This case is important because in every competitive E τ -equilibrium less patient agents inevitably lose their capital with time. The following proposition verifies that the whole capital stock eventually belongs to the most patient agents.
Proposition B3. Suppose that
is a competitive E τ -equilibrium starting from an arbitrary state I τ −1 . Then there exists a point in time T such that for all t ≥ T ,
Proof of Propositions B2 and B3 is very similar to that of Propositions A1 and A2. Without loss of generality, let us consider the case τ = 0, and give a sketch of the proof.
In a competitive E 0 -equilibrium
, k * * t , r * * t , w * * t , q * * t , v * * t t=0,1,...
satisfies the following first-order conditions:
If β j < β, then s j * * t = 0 for all sufficiently large t.
Proof. This lemma can be proved in the same way as Lemma A1.
It is sufficient to repeat the argument used in the proof of Lemma A2.
Lemma B3.
Proof. This statement follows from Lemma B2 Lemma B4.
Proof. This lemma can be proved in the same way as Lemma A4.
Lemma B5. For a sufficiently large T there exists δ > 0 such that for all t ≥ T ,
Proof. This lemma can be proved in the same way as Lemma A5.
Proposition B3 follows from Lemma B5. Proposition B2 follows directly from Lemma B6 which explicitly constructs a competitive E 0 -equilibrium starting from the state I −1 such thatŝ
Lemma B6. If
then for all t = 0, 1, . . .,
Proof. By Lemma B4,
At the same time, by Lemma B2,
0 , and hence s j * * 0
. We have proved the lemma for t = 0. To prove it for t = 1, 2, . . ., it is sufficient to repeat the argument.
B.2 Balanced-growth equilibrium under given extraction rate
Suppose that the sequence of extraction rates is constant,
Then, clearly,
starting from I τ −1 is called a balanced-growth E ε -equilibrium if there exist an equilibrium rate of balanced growth γ * * and the rate of change of the resource price, π * * , such that for t = τ, τ + 1, . . .,
The following proposition provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a balanced-growth E ε -equilibrium. In particular, this proposition maintains that in a balanced-growth equilibrium only the most patient agents make positive savings and own the whole capital stock.
Proposition B4. Suppose that a constant sequence of extraction rates E ε is given. A balanced-growth E ε -equilibrium
starting from a non-degenerate state
and (38)- (40) hold.
Proof. It can be proved exactly in the same way as Proposition A3.
The following proposition maintains that the interest rate, the equilibrium rate of balanced growth, and the rate of change of the resource price are determined by the parameters of the model and by the constant over time extraction rate ε. Proposition B5. Suppose that a constant sequence of extraction rates E ε is given. In a balanced-growth E ε -equilibrium, the interest rate, the equilibrium rate of balanced growth, and the rate of change of the resource price are determined as follows:
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition A4.
The following proposition maintains that every competitive E ε τ -equilibrium under given constant sequence of extraction rates converges to a balanced-growth E ε -equilibrium.
Proposition B6. Every competitive E ε τ -equilibrium starting from an arbitrary state I τ −1 satisfies the following asymptotic properties: Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition A5.
B.3 Time τ extraction rate
Before making extraction rates endogenous, let us explore the dependence of a competitive E τ -equilibrium on the time τ extraction rate.
Suppose we are given a sequence of extraction rates E τ is replaced by some other extraction rate ε τ , while all future extraction rates remain intact. Clearly, the volumes of extraction and the dynamics of the resource stock before and after this replacement are linked in the following way:
A competitive E 0 τ -equilibrium should also change. The change of a competitive E 0 τ -equilibrium and the dependence of a new equilibrium on ε τ is characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma B7. Suppose that for a sequence of extraction rates
. .}, and
Consider the sequencẽ
The sequenceẼ τ (ε τ ) is a competitive E τ -equilibrium starting from the same state
This lemma plays a very important role in our further considerations. If both the competitive E 0 τ -equilibrium and the competitive E τ -equilibrium are unique, then (41)-(54) provides formulas of transition from the equilibrium before the change of the time τ extraction rate to the equilibrium after the change. If we cannot guarantee the uniqueness of a competitive E τ -equilibrium, then the interpretation of this lemma is slightly different. It maintains that after the change of the time τ extraction rate, there exists a competitive equilibrium which is given by (41)-(54).
Proof. For the simplicity of exposition let us slightly abuse the notation and write simplyk t ,w t , etc., instead ofk t (ε τ ),w t (ε τ ), etc.
Obviously,k τ = k * * τ , as the initial state is the same. Directly from (41)-(42) and (49)-(50), we get
It is also clear that capital and labor are paid their marginal products:
It remains to show that the sequence
at r t =r t , w t =w t , and v t =ṽ t .
Equivalently, it remains to show the validity of the following conditions
Note that the sequence (c
is a solution to maximization problem (37) and hence satisfies the first-order conditions: Consider (55) for t = τ . We havẽ
Consider (55) for t = τ + 1.
The validity of conditions (55) for t ≥ τ + 2 and (56) for t ≥ τ can be proved similarly. To complete the proof of the lemma, it remains to notice that 
B.4 Time τ voting equilibrium
We have characterized a competitive equilibrium and a balanced-growth equilibrium under given sequence of extraction rates. Now we make extraction rates endogenous and introduce the voting mechanism into our model. Suppose that we start at time τ . The economy is in the non-degenerate state
Suppose that agents have expectations about the future extraction rates, {ε e t } ∞ t=τ +1 , and they are asked to vote on the time τ extraction rate. For any ε τ ∈ (0, 1) consider the sequence of extraction rates
Let us assume that for any ε τ ∈ (0, 1) there is a unique competitive E τ (ε τ )-equilibrium starting from I τ −1 :
It is clear, that E * * τ (ε τ ) depends on the expectations and on the parameters of the model as well. However, here we underline its dependence only on ε τ , as it is the value on which voting takes place.
Under the uniqueness assumption, agents' preferences over the time τ extraction rate are represented by the following indirect utility functions:
Definition. Suppose that for any ε τ ∈ (0, 1) there is a unique competitive E τ (ε τ )-equilibrium starting from I τ −1 , E * * τ (ε τ ). We call a couple {ε * * τ , E * * τ } a time τ voting equilibrium if ε * * τ is a Condorcet winner in voting on the time τ extraction rate, and E * * τ = E * * τ (ε * * τ ).
are strictly concave, the median voter theorem is applied, and a Condorcet winner exists. Note that the time τ voting equilibrium consists of the time τ voting equilibrium extraction rate ε * * τ and the associated competitive equilibrium.
In order to determine a Condorcet winner, let us consider the preferred time τ extraction rate for agent j. This is the value ε j τ such that
From Lemma B7 we know how the consumption stream of every agent depends on the time τ extraction rate. This allows us to obtain agents' preferred values of time τ extraction rate.
Proposition B7. Suppose that for any ε τ ∈ (0, 1) there is a unique competitive E τ (ε τ )-equilibrium starting from I τ −1 . The preferred time τ extraction rate for agent j is ε
Proof. Let us take some 0 < ε 0 τ < 1, and consider the sequence
By assumption, there is a unique competitive
starting from I τ −1 . We use this equilibrium as a benchmark. Further, for any ε τ ∈ (0, 1) there is a unique competitive E τ (ε τ )-equilibrium
starting from I τ −1 .
From Lemma B7 we know that after changing the time τ extraction rate from ε 0 τ to ε τ , the benchmark equilibrium E * * τ (ε 0 τ ) transforms to the "new" equilibrium E * * τ (ε τ ) according to the formulas (41)-(54). In particular, the consumption stream of agent j is given by (47)-(48). Therefore, the indirect utility function of agent j in this equilibrium is given by:
where
Note that Γ j does not depend on ε τ , on which voting takes place. Γ j depends on the parameters of the model and on the characteristics (extraction rate ε 0 τ and the consumption stream) of the benchmark equilibrium E * * τ (ε 0 τ ). When voting on ε τ , agent j maximizes her indirect utility U j τ (ε τ ), i.e., solves
This equation can be rewritten as
The solution to this equation is ε j τ = 1 − β j . Proposition B7 maintains that the preferred time τ extraction rate for every agent is constant over time and depends only on this agent's discount factor. In particular, the preferred time τ extraction rate for agent j is time-and expectationsindependent.
Now it is straightforward to see that the Condorcet winner in voting on the time τ extraction rate turns out to be ε * * τ = 1 − β med , where β med is the median discount factor.
Thus the following theorem takes place.
Theorem B1. Suppose that for any ε τ ∈ (0, 1) there is a unique competitive E τ (ε τ )-equilibrium starting from I τ −1 . Then there exists a unique time τ voting equilibrium {ε * * τ , E * * τ }. The equilibrium extraction rate is constant over time and given by ε * * τ = ε * * = 1 − β med .
B.5 Intertemporal voting equilibrium
Suppose we are given an initial state
,R −1 } and a sequence of extraction rates E * * = E * * 0 = {ε * * t } ∞ t=0 . Therefore, the volumes of extraction and the dynamics of the resource stock are also known: e * * t = e t (E * * ), R * * t = R t (E * * ), t = 0, 1, . . . . Definition. We call a couple {E * * , E * * 0 } an intertemporal voting equilibrium starting from I −1 if for each time τ = 0, 1, . . ., a couple {ε * * τ , E * * τ } is a time τ voting equilibrium starting from I * * τ −1 under perfect foresight about the future extraction rates (ε e t = ε * * t , t = τ + 1, τ + 2, . . .).
The following theorem provides the characterization of the sequence of extraction rates in every intertemporal voting equilibrium. Theorem B2. In every intertemporal voting equilibrium {E * * , E * * 0 } the sequence of extraction rates E * * is constant over time and given by E * * = E ε * * = {ε * * , ε * * , . . .},
where ε * * is defined by (59).
Proof. The sequence of extraction rates in every intertemporal voting equilibrium is the sequence of time τ equilibrium extraction rates. It follows from Theorem B1 that every equilibrium extraction rate is constant and given by (59). The answer to the question about the existence and uniqueness of an intertemporal voting equilibrium is provided by the following theorem. It states that if the initial state is such that the whole capital stock belongs to the most patient agents, then an intertemporal voting equilibrium exists and is unique. 
and 1 + π * * = 1 + γ * * β med .
Proof. It follows from Proposition B6 and Theorem B3.
B.7 Generalized intertemporal voting equilibria
Our definition of an intertemporal voting equilibrium is given under the assumption of uniqueness of a competitive E τ (ε τ )-equilibrium for any ε τ ∈ (0, 1). This assumption is crucial in the statement of Theorem B1 about the constant equilibrium extraction rate. Moreover, we obtained the existence and uniqueness of an intertemporal voting equilibrium (Theorem B3) only for the case in which the underlying competitive equilibria are unique. Thus to guarantee the mere existence of an intertemporal voting equilibrium, we have to prove the uniqueness of a competitive E τ (ε τ )-equilibrium for any ε τ ∈ (0, 1) starting from an arbitrary state I τ −1 , which is not an easy task.
Let us discuss the general case in which the competitive E τ (ε τ )-equilibrium starting from an arbitrary state I τ −1 is not necessarily unique. The difficulty here is that we cannot unambiguously define agents' indirect utility functions and obtain from them agents' preferred values of extraction rates. However, if we apply the technique proposed in (Borissov et al, 2014) , we can get around this difficulty.
Namely, let us impose an additional assumption on the beliefs of agents. Assume that agents simply act as if a competitive E τ (ε τ )-equilibrium is unique, and do not take into account the possible multiplicity of equilibria.
Formally, let E * * = E * * 0 = {ε * * t } ∞ t=0 , and e * * t = e t (E * * ), R * * t = R t (E * * ), t = 0, 1, . . . . L j=1 , R * * τ −1 }, agents are asked to vote on the time τ extraction rate. To do this, agents' indirect utility functions should be unambiguously specified. Originally this was done under the assumption of uniqueness of the competitive E * * τ -equilibrium starting from I * * τ −1 . Now let us instead assume that when voting on the time τ extraction rate, all agents believe that if ε * * τ is replaced by the other extraction rate ε τ , then the economy will settle on the pathẼ τ (ε τ ), which is linked with the "initial" equilibrium E * * τ in the way described in Lemma B7. Recall that under the uniqueness assumption, the interpretation of Lemma B7 is simple. After changing the time τ extraction rate from ε * * τ to ε τ , the unique competitive E * * -equilibrium also changes, and becomes the unique competitive E τ -equilibrium, described in Lemma B7. Here the interpretation is slightly different. After changing the time τ extraction rate, the competitive E * * -equilibrium can change unpredictably, and the economy can in principle settle on one of multiple E τ -equilibria. Under our assumption about agents' beliefs, agents ignore the possible multiplicity of equilibria and believe that after the change of the time τ extraction rate, the economy settles on the path E τ (ε τ ), which is described in Lemma B7.
Consider a competitive E
Under this additional assumption, agents' indirect utility functions, which represent their preferences over the time τ extraction rate, can be defined unambiguously as follows: Definition. If for each t = 0, 1, . . . there is a Condorcet winner in voting on ε t described above, and it coincides with ε * * t , then we call a couple {E * * , E * * 0 } a generalized intertemporal voting equilibrium starting from I −1 .
Clearly, any intertemporal voting equilibrium is a generalized intertemporal voting equilibrium. Moreover, any generalized intertemporal voting equilibrium starting from the initial state where the whole capital stock belongs to the most patient agents is an intertemporal voting equilibrium. Under the additional assumption about agents' beliefs, there always exists a generalized intertemporal voting equilibrium starting from an arbitrary initial state.
Theorem B5. For any non-degenerate initial state there exists a generalized intertemporal voting equilibrium {E * * , E * * 0 } starting from this state. The equilibrium sequence of extraction rates is constant over time and given by (60).
Proof. It is sufficient to repeat the argument used in the proof of Theorem B2, and refer to Proposition B1.
Furthermore, every generalized intertemporal equilibrium converges to a balancedgrowth voting equilibrium.
Theorem B6. Every generalized intertemporal equilibrium starting from an arbitrary initial state satisfies asymptotic properties (61)-(65), where γ * * and π * * are given by (66) and (67) respectively.
Proof. It follows from Proposition B6 and Theorem B5.
